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LABOR LAW-NLRB Refuses To Apply Related Work
Doctrine to Construction Site PicketingBuilding & Construction Trades Council
(Markwell & Hartz)*
The New Orleans Building and Construction Trades Council,
an association of craft unions, was engaged in a labor dispute with
Markwell & Hartz, the general contractor on a construction project.
In support of its dispute with the general contractor (primary employer), the Council picketed all gates leading to the job site,
although some gates had been specifically reserved for the exclusive
use of those subcontractors (secondary employers) with whom the
union had no dispute. Employees of the subcontractors refused to
cross the picket line to perform work pursuant to their employers'
contracts with the general contractor. Markwell & Hartz filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alleging
that the Council's activities constituted a violation of section 8(b)
(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act.1 The Board held, two

• 1965 CCH NLRB

1f 9787.

1. 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1964). Section 8(b)(4)(B) presently

reads as follows:
S(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents .•.
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce . • . to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course
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members dissenting, that the Council had committed an unfair
labor practice. 2 The picketing of gates reserved for the exclusive use
of employees of subcontractors at a construction site is an illegal
appeal to such employees.3
Although unions admittedly have an interest in bringing economic pressure to bear on employers with whom they have a labor
dispute, neutral employers also have an interest in being free from
"pressures in controversies not their own." 4 Since the two interests
frequently collide,5 Congress has attempted to provide the NLRB
and the courts with guidelines for balancing these interests. Thus,
sections 7 and 13 generally protect the right of employees to strike
and engage in other concerted activities, 6 while section 8(b)(4)(B)
specifically prohibits union refusals (or inducements of refusals) to
perform any services when an object of the refusal is to force one
employer to stop doing business with another. 7
It is clear that by enacting section 8(b)(4) Congress intended to
of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or
work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services;
or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce ... where
in either case an object thereof is(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, proces•
sor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing
or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization
as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been
certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9:
Provided, that nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make
unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any ••. primary picketing.
2. Building &: Constr. Trades Council (Markwell &: Hartz), 1965 CCH NLRB

f: 9787 [hereinafter cited as principal case]. The order of the Board in the case is
not included in the report of the decision.
3. The Board regarded the picketing of the reserved gate as lawful during the
period that deliverymen were permitted to use it. The Board stated:
Although a common situs problem is presented where a gate is reserved for both
neutral subcontractors and persons making deliveries to a struck contractor, a
balance of the competing interests underlying 8(b)(4)(B) requires our respecting
the traditional right of labor organizations to appeal to such deliverymen as
lawful incident of legitimate strike actions against the primary employer.
Principal case ,i 9787, at 16623 n.22.
4. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951); see
Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 679 (1961); Sailors'
Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 549 (1950).
5. See Local 761, Int'! Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 673 (1961).
See generally Bartley, The Carrier Corporation Case and the Related Work Doctrine:
Appeals to Neutral Employees as Protected Picketing, 16 LAB. L.J. 294, 295 (1965).
6. Section 7 provides that "employees shall have the right ••. to engage in . . .
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). Section 13 states that "nothing
in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right." 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1964).
7. See text of statute quoted note 1 supra.
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restrict sharply the use of secondary boycotts8-classically defined as
a "combination to influence A by exerting some sort of economic or
social pressure against persons who deal with A." 9 The original
statutory provision, however, did not provide any rigid rules for
distinguishing condemned secondary activity from traditionally approved "primary" activity. 1° Furthermore, the 1959 addition of a
proviso to section 8(b)(4)(B), which expressly excepts "primary" activity from the prohibition, 11 serves only as evidence of a congressional approval of the "primary-secondary dichotomy." 12 The Board
and the courts have thus had the responsibility of determining when
union pressure on secondary employers ceases to be an "intrinsic element of an 'ordinary strike.' " 13 This question generally arises when
the picketing which results from a union's dispute with an employer
extends beyond that employer's workforce, 14 his premises,1 6 or
both. 16
Initially, the NLRB took what has been described as a "geographical approach" to the problem. 17 All picketing at the premises of
the principal or primary employer was permissible even though
directed at employees of secondary employers, 18 since "traditional
primary strike action" has always included efforts "to induce and
encourage third persons to cease doing business with the picketed
employer" and "to respect a primary picket line at the employer's
premises.'' 19 Section 8(b)(4), according to the Board, "was intended
only to outlaw certain secondary boycotts, whereby unions sought
to enlarge the economic battleground beyond the premises of the
primary employer." 20 Thus, only appeals to secondary employees
8. See, e.g., Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 671
(1961); NI:.RB v. Denver Bldg. &: Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 686 (1951);
Bartley, supra note 5; Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1363 (1962).
9. FRANKFURTER&: GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 43 (1930).
10. See Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961).
11. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 704(a), 73 Stat. 543,
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1964).
12. See generally United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492 (1964); Local 761, Int'!
Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
13. St. Antoine, What Makes Secondary Boycotts Secondary?, in SournwESTERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION, llrn INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW 5, 17 (1964).
14. See, e.g., Local 761, Int'! Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
15. See, e.g., Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547
(1950).
16. See, e.g., NLRB v. Denver Bldg. &: Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
See generally Bartley, supra note 5; St. Antoine, supra note 13.
17. St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 17.
18. See Oil Workers Int'l Union (Pure Oil Co.), 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949) (picketing
at primary's dock; secondary employees refused to cross picket line); United Elec.
Radio &: Mach. Workers (Ryan Constr. Corp.), 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949) (picketing gate
reserved by primary employer for exclusive use by employees of contractor constructing
addition to primary's plant).
19. Oil Workers Int'! Union (Pure Oil Co.), supra note 18, at 318-19.
20. United Elec., Radio &: Mach. Workers (Ryan Constr. Corp.), 85 N.L.R.B. 417,
418 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
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which sought to induce a work stoppage at their employer's premises were thought to be prohibited by 8(b)(4).
Despite the appropriateness of a geographical approach in situations involving a location occupied by a single employer, such an
approach has proved to be an unsatisfactory vehicle for analyzing
the legality of so-called common-situs picketing. Such picketing may
occur in any one of the following three situations: (1) the employees
of the primary employer may be temporarily working at the premises of the secondary employer; 21 (2) the employees of the secondary employer may be temporarily working at the premises of the
primary employer; 22 or (3) the employees of both the primary and
secondary employers may be temporarily working at a site which is
not the permanent place of business of either employer (as in the
principal case). 23 In determining the legality of common-situs
picketing, the Board and the courts have consistently commenced
their analysis with the NLRB's decision in Sailors' Union of the
Pacific (1'-Ioore Dry Dock Co.),24 a case involving a ship owned by the
primary employer which was being unloaded and repaired at the
dock of the secondary employer. The issue framed by the Board was
whether the right of the union to picket followed the situs of the
dispute (in this case the ship on which the employees of the primary
employer worked) to the premises of a secondary employer.25 Although the Board concluded that the right to picket follows the
situs of the dispute, it held that the enmeshing of the situs of
the dispute with the premises of the secondary employer limited the
scope of permissible primary picketing. The picketing would be
considered lawful so long as all of the following criteria were
satisfied:
(a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises;
(b) at the time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged
in its normal business at the situs;
(c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location
of the situs; and
(d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the
primary employer.2s

In formulating "these tests, the Board's basic aim seemed to be the
protection of secondary employers from effects greater than those
21. See, e.g., Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547
(1950).
22. See, e.g., Retail Fruit &: Vegetable Clerks' Union (Crystal Palace Mkt.), 116
N.L.R.B. 856 (1956), enforced, 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957).
23. See, e.g., Local 55, Carpenters Council (Professional &: Business Men's Life Ins.
Co.), 108 N.L.R.B. 363, enforced, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954).
24. 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
25. Id. at 549.
26, Ibid.
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they would have experienced had their employees been induced to
refuse to work on the ship at the primary's own place of business.
The rights that the union would have had if the ship had been
moored at the primary's own dock followed the ship, provided that
the consequences of the picketing were similarly limited.27 Thus,
insofar as the appeal to secondary employees was limited to inducements to refuse to work on the primary's ship, the picketing was
clearly lawful.
Although the Board's purpose in Moore was to determine when
and how unions may picket secondary' employees at a place other
than the primary employer's premises, the change in the Board's
personnel after 1952 resulted in the use of an entirely different approach. The new Board chose to interpret section 8(b)(4)(B) literally
and consequently all appeals which encouraged secondary employees
to refuse to work in any one of the common situs situations became
illegal. 28 With this as the Board's point of departure, the Moore
standards were no longer considered determinative of when and
where secondary employees could be picketed; they could not be
picketed at all. Rather than discarding lvloore as irrelevant, however,
the Board used the standards for determining the subjects at whom
the picketing was aimed. 29 Any picketing which did not meet the
four tests was thus deemed to be aimed at secondary employees and
was, therefore, unlawful.
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court "stepped in to rechart
the direction of the law."30 In General Electric, the Board, pursuant
to its literal approach to section 8(b)(4)(B), had held that the picketing of those gates to the primary employer's manufacturing plant
27. See St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 21.
28. See, e.g., Retail Fruit & Vegetable Clerks' Union (Crystal Palace Mkt.), 116
N.L.R.B. 856 (1956), enforced, 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957) (picketing at market place
owned by primary and operated by primary and secondary lessees); Local 55, Carpenters Council (Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co.), 108 N.L.R.B. 363, enforced, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954) (picketing construction site owned by primary who
acted as his own general contractor); Local 618, Automotive, Petroleum & Allied Indus.
Employees Union (Incorporated Oil Co.), 116 N.L.R.B. 1844 (1956), rev'd, 249 F.2d 332
(8th Cir. 1957) (picketed primary's gas station when only persons present were construction employees rebuilding a structure on the premises); Union de Trabajadores da
Ia Gonzales Chem. Indus., 128 N.L.R.B. 1352 (1960), rev'd sub nom. Teamsters Union v.
NLRB, 293 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (per curiam) (picketing at primary's plant directed
at construction workers erecting an addition); Local 761, Int'I Union of Elec., Radio &
Mach. Workers (General Electric Co.), 123 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1959), rev'd, 366 U.S. 667
(1961).
29. See cases cited note 28 supra. Compare Seafarers' Int'l Union (Salt Dome Prod.
Co.), 119 N.L.R.B. 1638 (1958), rev'd, 265 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1959) in which the court
seems to revert to an analysis much like that in Moore in that appeals directed to
secondary employees were held not to be prohibited simply because they were so
directed. Rather, they were prohibited only when they were aimed at a boycott of the
secondary employer broader than its business relation with the primary employer. See
Lesnick, supra note 8, at 1374-84.
30. St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 26.
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which were reserved for the exclusive use of secondary employees
was prohibited because such picketing was obviously a direct appeal
to the secondary employees.31 The Supreme Court reversed the
Board's decision and expressly repudiated the theory that all appeals
to secondary employees are illegal.32 The Court held that picketing
aimed at secondary employees who perform work that it related to
the day-to-day operations of the primary employer is within the
scope of protected primary activity.33
Notwithstanding the General Electric decision, the Board refused
to make the related work inquiry in the principal case. As it had
done in the past, the Board applied the Moore test, determined that
the picketing was aimed at secondary employees, and concluded
that such conduct was unlawful. In refusing to apply the related
work doctrine, the Board indicated that the Supreme Court had
intended the doctrine to be applicable only to picketing which
occurs at the premises of the primary employer.34 Although the
Board's position does seem to be supported by the facts in General Electric, a second Supreme Court decision, United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Carrier Corp.), 85 casts doubt upon the Board's
conclusion. As in General Electric, the picketing in Carrier occurred
at a gate of a struck manufacturing plant, which gate was reserved
for the exclusive use of the secondary employees. Although the gate
was adjacent to the primary's plant (it had, in fact, been owned by
the primary at one time), it was located on property owned by the
secondary employer. In holding that the picketing was lawful, the
Court referred to the 1959 proviso expressly excepting primary
picketing from the prohibitions of section 8(b)(4), and stated that
the scope of protected union activity must be determined by the
31. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio &: Mach. Workers, 123 N.L.R.B. 1547
(1959).
32. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
33. In the General Electric case, the Court stated:

Where the work done by the secondary employees is unrelated to the normal
operations of the primary employer, it is difficult to perceive how the pressure of
picketing the entire situs is any less on the neutral employer merely because the
picketing takes place at property owned by the struck employer. The application
of the Dry Dock tests to limit the picketing effects to the employees of the employer
against whom the dispute is directed carries out the "dual congressional objectives
of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers
and others from pressures in controversies not their own."
Id. at 679 (quoting in part from NLRB v. Denver .Bldg.&: Constr. Trades Council, 341
U.S. 675,692 (1951)). (Emphasis added.)
34. It is plain, therefore, that the Court did not seek to interfere with the Board's
traditional approach to common situs problems •••• [R]ather, the Court's decisions in General Electric and Carrier Corp., merely represent an implementation of
the concomitant policy that lenient treatment be given to strike action taking
place at the separate premises of a struck employer.
Principal case 'ii 9787, at 16623.
35. 376 U.S. 492 (1964).
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interest of the union in "halting the day-to-day operations of the
struck employer" through economic pressure.86
The Board's position that the related work doctrine applies only
to picketing which occurs at the primary employer's premises may be
supported by the Court's repeated reference in Carrier to the primary's plant.87 However, there is also language in the opinion which
suggests that location is significant only insofar as it aids the factual
inquiry into whether the work of the secondary employees is related
to the primary employer's everyday operations.88 It would seem that
the latter rather than the former interpretation is more in keeping
with the Court's underlying position in Carrier and General Electric
that neutral employers who contribute to the normal operations of
the primary employer lose their neutrality, and that appeals may
be made to such of their employees as do contribute to those operations.89 The Court's theory is that if the work of the secondary
employees and the daily operations of the primary employer are so
interrelated that the cessation of the primary's operations renders
the services or materials supplied by the secondary employees superfluous, the secondary employees are proper objects of primary picketing. By depriving the secondary employer of this outlet for his
materials and services, the union accomplishes only that which
would have occurred had there been a successful shut down of the
primary employer. Clearly, this functional analysis transcends geographical considerations except to the extent that the place where
the secondary employees render their services is evidence of the
relationship between those services and the primary employer's
normal operations.4° Consequently, it appears that in any common36. Id. at 499.
37. Id. at 499-501.
38. The Court noted that the gate picketed was on property owned by the secondary
employer and only adjacent to the struck employer's plant. It then stated:
[T]he location of the J.>icketing is an important but not decisive factor ••• [that]
"the picketing was designed to accomplish no more than picketing outside one of
Carrier's own delivery entrances might have accomplished" ••• [and that] picketing
at a situs so proximate and related to the employer's day-to-day operations is no
more illegal than if it had occurred at a gate owned by Carrier.
Id. at 499-500.
39. In a series of cases originating and developing the so-called "ally" doctrine, the
courts have recognized that a similar situation exists when one employer aids a struck
employer by performing work that the struck employer would otherwise have done, in
an attempt to break the strike. The secondary employer is regarded as an "ally" rather
than a "neutral" and § 8(b)(4) is construed to protect only "neutral" secondary em•
ployees. See NLRB v. Business Mach. Mechanics, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956); Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672
(S.D.N.Y. 1948). See generally Asher, Secondary Boycotts-Allied, Neutral and Single
Employers, 52 GEO. L.J. 406 (1964); Note, The "Ally" Doctrine Under Section B(bX4XB):
A Functional Approach, 37 N.Y.UL. REv. 508 (1962).
40. The only effect on the secondary employer is that he loses a market for his
goods or services. This result obtains from the very fact that a successful strike closes
down his customer. In Seafarers Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1959), the
union picketed at a shipyard owned by a secondary employer because the primary
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situs situation the Moore standards are only evidentiary aids for
determining whether picketing is, in fact, directed at secondary
employees.41 If it is so directed, General Electric and Carrier seemingly require the additional inquiry of whether the aim of the appeals is to deprive the secondary employer of no more than the
market for his goods or services that was supplied by the normal
operations of the primary employer.
The second, but perhaps primary, reason why the Board refused
to apply the related work doctrine in the principal case was its concern with the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Denver Bldg.
b Constr. Trades Council.42 In Denver the union had picketed an
entire construction site in aid of its dispute with a non-union subcontractor.43 The employees of other subcontractors and of the
general contractor refused to work on the project. The employees
of the non-union subcontractor, however, continued to work until
the general contractor terminated their employer's contract and
replaced them with union workers. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Board's determination44 that the picketing was designed to force
the general contractor to cease doing business with the non-union
subcontractor, and thus was a violation of section 8(b)(4).
In the principal case, the Board argued that the application of
the related work doctrine to construction site picketing would have
the effect of reversing Denver.45 Since the Supreme Court had not
expressly overruled Denver in General Electric or Carrier, the Board
was unwilling to do so in the principal case. It appears, however,
employer's ship was docked there. In upholding the picketing, even though it resulted
in the secondary employees' refusal to work on the ship, the Court of Appeals said:
[T)his pressure was the same sort as that felt by an employer when one of his
major suppliers or customers is being picketed, or that which a contractor feels
when a subcontractor is struck at a crucial point in construction•••• Here Todd,
the unoffending employer, bore no more adverse effects than it would have suffered
had it been working on the Pelican [the primary employer's ship] at a dock owned
by Salt Dome [the primary employer] several miles away and had the picketing
been at that dock.
Id. at 591-92.
41. Recent Board decisions recognize that the Moore tests are evidentiary guides
rather than mechanical rules. See, e.g., United .Bhd. of Carpenters (Dobson Heavy
Haul, Inc.), 1966 CCH NLRB 11 20059 (1965); Office & Professional Employees
(American Presidents Lines, Ltd.), 1966 CCH NLRB 11 20190 (1966).
'
42. !l41 U.S. 675 (1951).
4!l. Section 1 of article 1-B of the Council's by-laws, as cited by the Court, !l41 U.S.
at 678 n.!l, contained a self-imposed duty "to stand for absolute closed shop conditions
on all jobs."
44. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 82 N.L.R.B. 1195
(1949), enforcement denied, 186 F.2d !l26 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
45. Principal case 11 9787, at 16624. The Board also argued that because the Supreme Court rejected the union's contention in Denver that the contractor and subcontractor were "allies," Denver was support for the Board's refusal now to apply the
related work doctrine. The fallacy in the Board's reasoning lies in the premise that
the "ally" doctrine and the related work doctrine apply to the same factual situations.
See authorities cited note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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that the facts in Denver are distinguishable from those in the principal case, and consequently the Board need not have felt bound
by the Denver precedent. In Denver, the union's dispute was with a
subcontractor on the construction project, not with a general contractor. A subcontractor's normal operations are limited to a specific
part of the project, and the union's interest is correspondingly
limited to the closing down of that particular operation. Nevertheless, the union had directed its picketing at all secondary employees,
including employees of the general contractor, without regard to
the relationship between the work of the subcontractor and the
work of the general contractor. Since this picketing was designed to
deprive the secondary employers of any work by their employees
and to force these employers to refuse to deal with the primary
employer, it is distinguishable from the questioned activity in the
principal case where the union's dispute was with the general contractor and the work of the subcontractors who were the objects of
the picketing was clearly related to the general contractor's daily
operations. The picketing in the principal case was thus aimed at
depriving the secondary employers only of that which they would
have been deprived of had the union been successful in forcing the
general contractor to halt its operations.
· These comments are not intended to imply that the principal
case and Denver are to be distinguished simply by the fact that the
primary employer was a general contractor in one case and a subcontractor in the other. Instead, the distinction is and must be based on
a functional analysis of the relationship between the work of the
secondary employees and the daily operations of the primary employer. Thus, if the union in Denver had picketed only those
employees of the general contractor who specifically aided the primary's employees, the related work doctrine would have operated to
sustain the union's appeal to such employees.46 On the other hand,
an application of the related work doctrine may result in a decision
that picketing of a subcontractor's employees is illegal in a union
dispute with the general contractor. For example, in Local Union
No. 55 (Professional and Business Men's Life Ins. Co.),41 the union
picketed an entire construction project in a dispute with the landowner (an insurance company) who was acting as its own general
contractor. The Board held that the picketing was unlawful because it was directed at secondary employees (neutral subcontractors). In discussing this case in General Electric, the Supreme Court
approved the result, although it rested its decision on a finding that
"the work done by the . secondary amployees is unrelated to the
46. See St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 35.
47. 108 N.L.R.B. 363, enforced, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954).
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normal operations of the primary employer.'' 48 Thus, the Court
implied that the related work inquiry must be made in each case,
although in the majority of construction cases the subcontractor's
work will be sufficiently related to the normal operations of the general contractor.
Although it seems clear that the related work doctrine should
have been applied in the principal case, it is not clear that the application of the doctrine will, as a practical matter, consistently
prevent the evil that the statute was designed to eliminate. Even if
a union's appeal at a common situs complies with the Moore standards or is properly encompassed by the related work theory, it is
still possible that the mere presence of a picket at the project,
wherever located, will result in a refusal to work by employees of
all of the employers at the site. As Mr. Justice Douglas has said:
Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since
it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence
of a pick.et line may induce action of one kind or another,
quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being
disseminated.40

Thus, although the language of section 8(b)(4) is phrased in terms
of a forbidden "object," it is questionable whether the related work
doctrine, which delineates the scope of objects properly appealed to,
is an adequate protection to secondary employers if pickets do, in
fact, evoke responses from a secondary employee who is not properly
an object of the picketing.
There are at least three possible ways of dealing with the actual
effects of picketing which otherwise complies with the Moore or
related work standards: (I) all picketing could be forbidden when
there is an immediate danger that it will bring about the unlawful
result, irrespective of the objects of the picketing; (2) all picketing
which actually accomplishes a forbidden result could be declared an
unfair labor practice whether or not the union claims to have a
lawful object; or (3) all picketing limited to primary employees or
secondary employees who perform related work could be allowed regardless of the actual result of such picketing. It is believed that the
second proposal is the best solution. The first would probably run
afoul of the statutory language; if it did not, it would force the Board
to engage in subjective conjecture of the highest order and such a
rule may consequently result in the prohibiting of picketing which
neither aims at nor accomplishes the unlawful result. The third
proposal possesses the merit of certainty, but, unfortunately, is de48. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 679 (1961).
(Emphasis added.)
49. Bakery Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring, joined
by Black, J. and Murphy, J.).
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tached from reality. To allow all picketing which is addressed to
primary employees or secondary employees who perform related
work.without considering the actual effect of the picketing on other
secondary employees is to contravene the policies underlying the
statute-the protection of secondary employers from pressures which
infringe upon their neutral status. 50 The simple, workable standard
is the second proposal which would place on the union the burden
of insuring that the forbidden result does not occur, a burden which
the union is uniquely able to carry. The union's responsibility
would be to utilize internal controls to encourage union members
to disregard picket lines which are not properly directed at them,
just as the unions have, in the past, exerted internal controls to
promote a member's respect for such picket lines. Lawful picketing would not be directly curtailed, but the picketing union could
no longer condone a secondary employee's refusal to cross a picket
line when the picket line does not properly appeal to the employee.
Thus, it appears that the Moore tests should be used as evidentiary guides in determining at which employees the picketing is
directed and in setting the limits of an appeal to those employees
who are deemed primary employees. The related work test should
be applied to determine to which secondary employees, if any, a
union may lawfully appeal for support in a dispute with the primary
employer. Finally, picketing which fulfills the Moore or the related
work test, but which nevertheless results in refusals to work by other
secondary employees should be deemed to have an unlawful objective and should therefore be condemned.
50. See generally Lesnick, supra note 8. The objections in the text to the third
proposal are based on the present statutory language. However, a recent congressional
bill, H.R. 10027, would add a proviso to § 8(b)(4)(B) that would except from its
prohibitions any picketing at a construction site aimed at construction workers regard•
less of the effect the picketing has on neutral employees. The bill, in effect, proposes
that picketing at a construction project of the employees of general contractors and of
subconcontractors be treated just as picketing at a manufacturing plant of employees
who work in different departments of the plant. The House Committee of Education
and Labor reported a "clean" bill on H.R. 10027. H.R. REP. No. 1041, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965).

